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Redefining Objectivity:
The Case for the Reasonable Woman Standard
in Hostile Environment Claims
THE NATUREOF THE PROBLEM
I. INTRODUCTION:
When Kerry Ellison began receiving "love notes" from her
co-worker, Sterling Gray, she was convinced she was the target
of sexual harassment.' Mr. Gray, on the other hand, likely had
no idea his "romantic" gestures would be interpreted as harassment. Such inconsistency in interpretation is typical because
women tend to perceive sexual or gender-based conduct in the
workplace quite differently than men? What male workers
consider harmless, females might consider frightening; conduct
that some men see as flirtation or chivalry might be interpreted by some women as a n intimidating precursor to bolder-possibly violent+o~ertures.~In a Title VII sexual harassment case, the trier of fact must contend with this discrepancy
when determining whether certain conduct does, indeed, constitute harassment. Courts must choose, therefore, whether to
evaluate the conduct from the perspective of a reasonable male,
a reasonable female, or a reasonable gender-neutral "person."
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
suggests that courts scrutinize the offending conduct through
. ~ Ninth Circuit,
the eyes of a n objective, reasonable p e r ~ o n The
however, recently concluded i n Ellison v. grady5 that the reasonable person standard "tends to be male-biased and [to] sys-

1. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991); see also infia notes
6 1-68 and accompanying text.
2.
See David E. Terpstra & Douglas D. Baker, Sexual Harassment at Work:
The Psychosocial Issues, in VULNERABLE
WORKERS:PSYCHOSOCIAL
AND LEGALISSUES 186 (Marilyn J. Davidson & Jill Earnshaw eds., 1991); see also infia text
accompanying notes 76-93.
3.
See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880-82; see also Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND.L. REV. 1183, 1205
(1989).
4.
EEOC: P o l e Guidance on Sexual Harassment, [8 Fair Emp. Prac. Man.]
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) $ 405:6681 (1990) [hereinafter EEOC Policy Guidance]. The
emphasis in this EEOC instruction is arguably on objectivity rather than gender
neutrality. See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
5.
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tematically ignore the experiences of women."6 Accordingly,
the court held that the proper standard should be to view the
conduct from the perspective of a reasonable person of the
victim's gender.'
This comment examines the judicial standards currently
employed in determining whether workplace conduct constitutes "sexual harassment." Part I1 analyzes the history and
background of Title VII sexual harassment claims. Part I11 examines the ineffectiveness of the gender-neutral "reasonable
person" standard and the development and potential impact of
the reasonable woman standard? Part IV concludes that adoption of the reasonable woman standard more fully achieves the
purposes of Title VII by better protecting female employees,
reducing sexual harassment, and ensuring a n objective, fair
standard upon which employers and employees can rely.
OF

11. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
TITLEVII SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
CLAIMS

A. Title VII: Promulgation without Guidance
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from "discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."9 The word "sex" was not added to the statute

Id. at 879.
7.
To set out a hostile environment claim under Ellison, a female plaintiff
must establish that the alleged conduct would offend a reasonable woman. Id.
Judges and writers have been stridently calling for this standard for some time.
The most notable example is the dissent in Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d
611, 625 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also
Susan M. Mathews, Title VII and Sexual Harassment: Beyond Damages Control, 3
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM299 (1991); Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive
Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 WV.
L. REV. 1449 (1984); Barbara L.
Zalucki, Comment, Discrimination Law-Defining the Hostile Work Environment
NEW ENG.L. REV. 143 (1989).
Claim of Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 111.
It is important to note that the reasonable woman standard does not slight
8.
male victims of sexual harassment. Rather, the Ellison court clarifies that if the
victim were a male, the proper standard would be the perspective of a reasonable
male. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879. In other words, the reasonable woman standard, in
a broader sense, is really the reasonable victim standard, and the Ellison court, as
well as this comment, uses the terms interchangeably. See id. at 880; cf. infia
text accompanying notes 112-113. Because most victims of sexual harassment are
women, however, characterizing the standard as that of the "reasonable woman"
seems more appropriate.
9.
42 U.S.C.3 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988) (emphasis added).
6.
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until the "last minute"; consequently, legislative direction is
scant.'' The EEOC and the federal courts have been left to interpret exactly what Congress intended by including that word.
Initially, courts found a violation of Title VII when an employer
denied an individual some benefit of employment solely because of gender." However, the courts and the EEOC quickly
broadened Title W to also prohibit "sexual harassment" in the
workplace.

B. Further Clarification: The EEOC and the Courts
In 1971, the Fifth Circuit stated, 'We must be acutely conscious of the fact that Title VII . , . should be accorded a liberal
interpretation in order t o effectuate the purpose of Congress to
eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness, and humiliation of. . .
dis~rimination."'~
This advice prompted other courts t o "liberally interpret'' Title VII to prohibit sexual harassment in the
workplace because such conduct is inherently discriminatory.
As currently interpreted, Title VII prohibits two types of
sexual harassment: quid pro
and hostile environment.
The former occurs when an employer conditions employment
benefits on the granting of sexual favors.14 The latter, which
is the focus of this paper, occurs when an employee is subjected
to an "offensive or abusive" working environment.15 In 1980,
the EEOC promulgated its Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex,16 which offered definitions of sexual harassment
t o help courts and employers know what types of conduct
would violate Title VII." The Guidelines point out that al10. See Ellison, 924 F.2d a t 875 (citing 110 CONG.REC. 2577-84 (1964)).
11. See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
12. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
13. The term quid pro quo literally means "something for something." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY
1248 (6th ed. 1990).
14. Sexual Harassment Policy Guide, [8 Fair Emp. Prac. Man.] Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 8 421:453-54 (1992) [hereinafter Policy Guide]; see also Williams v. Saxbe,
413 F. Supp. 654, 662-63 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding that an employee's termination
after refusal to submit to her supervisor's sexual demands violated Title VII as
quid pro quo harassment).
15. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1991). This definition will be
further refined within this comment. The reasonable woman standard sprang up
amidst the confusion generated by the question of what, exactly, constitutes a
"hostile environment."
16.
29 C.F.R. 8 1604 (1992) [hereinafter Guidelines].
17.
The Guidelines state:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
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though not all gender-based conduct at work is proscribed by
Title VII, it "crosses the line" into harassment if it is "unwelcome sexual . . . conduct [that has become] . . . a term or condition of. . . employment."18 Others have suggested alternative
definitions,'' but generally conduct must be unwelcome to
qualify as harassing. The Guidelines further define a hostile
environment as a workplace where such unwelcome sexual
conduct "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimiFor exdating, hostile, or offensive working en~ironment."~~
ample, unwelcome touching, joking, gestures, and comments, as
well as offensive pictures, literature, or graffiti, can create a
hostile en~ironment.~~
The plaintiff need not suffer economic
harm t o sustain a claim against the employer for creating or
allowing such an environment.''
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment .
Id. § 1604.11(a).
18. Id. (emphasis added); see also Policy Guzde, supm note 14, 8 421:452.
19. For example, Catharine MacKinnon suggested that
sexual harassment . . . refers to the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power. Central to
the concept is the use of power derived from one social sphere to lever
benefits or impose deprivations in another . . . . When one is sexual, the
other material, the cumulative sanction is particularly potent.
CATHARINE
A. MACKTNNON, SEXUALHARASSMENT OF WORKINGWOMEN1 (1979)
(emphasis added). The Working Women's Institute defines harassment as "any
repeated or unwanted verbal or physical sexual advances; sexually explicit derogatory statements; or sexually discriminatory remarks made by someone in the
workplace which are offensive or objectionable to the recipient, or cause the recipient discomfort or humiliation, or interfere with the recipient's job performance."
& JAY
M. S H A F R ~SEXUAL^
,
IN ORGANIZATIONS:
ROMANTIC
DAILA. NEUGARTEN
AND COERCIVE BEHAVIORS
AT WORK3 (1980) (citation omitted).
These definitions seem fairly clear: unwanted or unwelcome gender-based conduct that disturbs the receiver in some way is harassment. The problem is that
the conduct, while offensive to the recipient, may seem entirely innocuous to the
offender. See id.
20.
Guidelines, supra note 16, § 1604.11(a)(3).
21.
See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 I?. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991);
ACADEMIC
AND WORKPLACE
see also MICHELEA. PALUDI& RICHARD B. BARICKMAN,
SEXUALHARASSMENT6 (1991).
22.
EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 4, 8 405:6682; see also Katz v. Dole, 709
F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983).
A
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The Guidelines instruct courts to examine the "totality of
the circumstances" t o determine hostility or "unwelcomen e s ~ . Factors
' ~ ~ include the following: (1)whether the conduct
was verbal, physical, or both; (2) whether the conduct was a
one-time occurrence or repeated; (3) whether the conduct was
hostile and patently offensive; (4) whether the alleged harasser
was a co-worker or a supervisor; (5) whether others joined in
perpetrating the harassment; and (6) whether the harassment
was directed at more than one individual." According t o the
Guidelines, courts should interpret the conduct "from the objective standpoint of a 'reasonable person.' "25
In 1983, the Eleventh Circuit followed the Guidelines and
held that an employer violates Title VII by creating a "hostile
environment":
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary
barrier to sexual equality a t the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man
or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the
privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be
as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithet~.~~

Other circuits also began to follow the Guidelines, defining the
types of conduct that would rise to the level of "hostile environment" sexual harassment. For example, in Katz v. Dole, the
Fourth Circuit held that an abundance of sexual slurs, insults,
epithets, and innuendo created a hostile workplace.27 The
plaintiff recovered even though she was not economically

Guidelines, supra note 16, 5 1604.11(b). The investigators must determine
23.
whether the victim's conduct was consistent with her claim that the offending conduct was not desired. A claimant's occasional use of sexually explicit language does
not indicate that subsequent sexual advances by others are welcome, and her "general character or past behavior toward others has limited, if any, probative value."
EEOC P o k y Guidance, supra note 4, 5 405:6687. But cf. Gan v. Kepro Circuit
Sys., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 639 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (holding that a woman's
sexually explicit conversation barred her from claiming that male co-workers' comments and conduct were unwelcome).
EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 4, 5 405:6689.
24.
25.
Id. The conduct must "substantially affect the work environment of a reasonable person" in order to be considered "hostile." Thus, Title VII is not a " behicle for vindicating the petty slights suffered by the hypersensitive.' " Id. (quoting
Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis. 1984)).
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982).
26.
Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983).
27.
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harmed.28 In Bundy u. Jackson, the D.C. Circuit deemed "hostile" a workplace in which sexual propositions and sexual intimidation by supervisors was "standard operating proced ~ r e . " ~ In
' Kinney v. Dole,30 a male supervisor forcefully
grabbed, twisted, and injured the arm of a female employee.
Although the act was not sexual in any romantic or traditional
sense, it was gender-based-an act of aggression by a male
against a female. As such, the D.C. Circuit held that it was discriminatory and created a n offensive, abusive w~rkplace.~'

C. The Supreme Court's Interpretation:
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
I n 1986, the first Title VII hostile environment case
reached the United States Supreme Court. In Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vin~on:~the plaintiff alleged that her male supervisor "fondled her in front of other employees, . . . exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several occasion^."^^
The Court, after carefully analyzing the EEOC Guidelines, held
that an employee can state a hostile environment claim if she
is subject to (1) "'sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
[or] other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature'"54
that is (2) "unwelcome" and (3) "hostile," i.e., "sufficiently severe
or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of. . . employment and
Under this test,
create an abusive working en~ironment."'~~
the Court had no dmculty finding Ms. Vinson to be a victim of
.~~
i n dehostile environment sexual h a r a ~ s m e n t Significantly,
termining whether the conduct was sexual harassment, the
Court followed the EEOC's guidance and scrutinized the conduct from the perspective of a reasonable person.
Meritor has become the touchstone in this area,37 but its

28.
Id.
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
29.
30.
765 F.2d 1129 @.C. Cir. 1985).
31.
Id. at 1138.
32.
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
Id. at 60.
33.
Id. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. 5 1604.11(a) (1985)).
34.
35.
Id. a t 67 (emphasis added) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
36.
Id. at 68. The fact that Ms. Vinson "voluntarily" submitted to much of the
conduct (for fear of her job, as well as her safety) did not mean the conduct was
"welcome." Id. at 67.
The Supreme Court has, however, granted certiorari in a case that could
37.
potentially impact the Meritor holding. See Hanis v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 976
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application has been problematic. Although its "test" is fairly
straightforward, it has not completely resolved the issue for
lower courts. Because the conduct in Meritor was so blatant,
the Court could establish a fairly elevated threshold and still
provide relief to Ms. Vinson. Consequently, conduct that is
somewhat less egregious, yet still offensive, may not qualify a s
"hostile."
The real problem lies much deeper. In applying the Meritor
reasonable person standard, federal courts have moved further
and further from considering the victim's perspective of the
incidents. Instead, as the following section will analyze, by neglecting the victim's perspective, courts have furthered stereotypical notions of acceptable male beha~ior.~'

A. Meritor and its Progeny
1. The problems with the Meritor test
Although the Meritor Court announced its intention to adhere to the EEOC Guidelines, its test is arguably more rigid
than the guideline^.^^ For example, the Meritor test requires
that conduct be "pervasive" or "severe" to constitute a violat i ~ n . ~The
'
EEOC standard, on the other hand, merely requires that the conduct be "unwelcome" and "ha[ve] the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with a n individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.'"' The range of conduct which
might be deemed offensive under the EEOC Guidelines is potentially much broader than that which would be actionable
under Meritor ?2
Additionally, the Court's use of the word "pervasive" denotes that the conduct must be "difhsed throughout every part
of" the workplace or be "prevalent or dominant."43 One in-

F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992) (unpublished disposition), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W.3511
(US.Mar. 1, 1993) (No. 92-1168).
38.
See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
39.
See Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience us. Legal Definitions, 13 HARV. WOMEN'SL.J. 35, 60 (1990).
40.
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
41.
Guidelines, supra note 16, 5 1604.11(a) (emphasis added).
42.
Pollack, supra note 39, at 59-61.
See WEBSTER'S
THIRDNEWINTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY
(16th ed. 1971) (defi43.
nitions of "pervade" and "pervasive").
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stance of "unwelcome" conduct would arguably not be actionable under Meritor. In one light, it may seem unreasonable to
impose liability for one remark or action. But if that one instance offends and intimidates nonetheless, it also seems unreasonable to not attach liability. As the Ninth Circuit explains, a single offense can be just as "intimidating or hostile"
as a continuing offense, especially because our culture and
media have taught women to read such events as precursors to
more violent acti0ns.4~Even one incident of harassment is
"unacceptable since it . . . require[s] women to act as subordiexample of Title VII-prohibited discriminan a t e [ ~ ] , "a~ clear
~
tion. On balance, the pervasiveness of the conduct should affect
only the type or amount of the remedy, not the finding of harassment .46
2. The results: The wreck in the wake of Meritor

Subsequent decisions, purporting to follow Meritor, demonstrate that the reasonable person standard-as articulated by
the EEOC and interpreted by the courts-is not as objective,
helpful, or even gender-neutral as it claims to be.
a. The cases. In Chamberlin v. 101 Realty:" the claimant was faced with five overt instances of sexual conduct. The
fust occurred while Mrs. Chamberlin was in her supervisor's
car. He turned to her and said, "with a little half smile and
very lustily,' that she had a 'good body.'"' Two weeks later,
the plaintiff testified that the defendant
"stepped up real close to me, like within a foot, almost to
where we were touching shoulders, and he looked at me,
started at my head and he looked all the way down to my
toes and back up again, and then he said, almost in a whisper, he said, 'You look good in tight jeans. It shows off your
butt.' "49

Defendant repeated this comment two weeks later. During two
subsequent lunch appointments, the supervisor took
Chamberlin's hands and said, "'I like my women with good

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991).
Pollack, supra note 39, at 61.

Id.
915 F.2d 777 (1st Cir. 1990).
Id. at 780.
Id.
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looks and brains,' " and " 'My women are special. I like to put
them on a pedestal."'50 Mrs. Chamberlin testified that she
physically resisted each of these advance^.^' Although she had
received excellent work reviews to that point, she was soon
fired.
Although the supervisor's actions constituted quid pro quo
harassment, the First Circuit held that they did not create a
hostile environment. In fact, under the Meritor test, the court
"consider[ed] it highly doubtful . . . that the sexual advances
made to Charnberlin in [those] circumstances, without more,
could be considered sufEciently 'severe or pervasive' to support
a sexual discrimination claim of the hostile environment
variety."52
In Scott u. Sears, Roebuck & Co.," the plaintiff was repeatedly propositioned by her supervisor, slapped on the buttocks by co-workers, and subjected to vulgar and demeaning
sexual comments? In holding that the conduct did not constitute sexual harassment, the Seventh Circuit noted that the
central issue was whether "the demeaning conduct and sexual
stereotyping cause[d] such anxiety and debilitation to the plaintiff that the working conditions were 'poisoned' within the
meaning of Title VII."55 The court held that the actions in this
case did not create such anxiety and d e b i l i t a t i ~ n . ~ ~
In Rabidue u. Osceola Refining Co.?' the plaintiff worked
in an environment littered with pornography and polluted with
crude and demeaning sexual epithets. Some male co-workers
referred to her, not by her given name, but rather by slang references to the female anatomy.58 Surprisingly, the Sixth Circuit held that the offensive posters and the vulgar comments
"were not so startling to have affected seriously the psyches of
the plaintiff or other female employees."59

Id.
Id. at 780.
Id. at 783.
798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 211-12.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 213-14.
805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 624 (Keith, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
805 F.2d at 622.
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b. The results. Title VII adjudication seems to have taken a wrong turn. These cases present facts that arguably dictate findings of hostile environment sexual harassment. Yet the
plaintiffs were denied recovery on their claims, and new judicial "tests" were created that are more stringent than the
Meritor test. The Scott test ("anxiety and debilitation sufficient
to poison the workplace"), the Rabidue test ("seriously affect
the psychological well being"), and the Chamberlin test ("pervasiveness") are errant departures from the EEOCs guiding
language.
The circuit courts did follow the EEOC instructions to the
extent that they viewed the "totality of the circumstances"
through the eyes of a "reasonable person," but they generally
failed to "consider the victim's perspective2'-the perspective of
a reasonable woman. By neglecting the victim's perspective and
choosing not to look through a woman's eyes, the courts unknowingly furthered stereotypes of acceptable male behavior.
Had the courts attempted to see the circumstances through the
eyes of a reasonable woman, instead of a gender-neutral "person," the judicial tests might have been less rigorous, the
thresholds lower, and the outcomes more equitable.
B. The Adoption of the Reasonable Woman Standard
In Ellison v. Brady, the Ninth Circuit applied the reasonable woman standard in a sexual harassment hostile environment case. The offending conduct in Ellison was less overtly
"hostile" than that in other cases; yet even in its subtlety, the
conduct was offensive to its victim. The offensive behavior began two years after Kerry Ellison and Sterling Gray began
working for the Internal Revenue Service in 1984. In 1986,
Gray began paying a great deal of attention to Ellison, "hanging around" her desk and extending frequent lunch invitations.
Ellison accepted one such invitation but declined two subsequent o f f e d l Shortly after her refusals, Gray wrote her a
note, stating, "I cried over you last night and I'm totally
drained today. I have never been in such constant term oil [sic].
Thank you for talking with me. I could not stand to feel your

60.
61.

Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 873-74.

REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD

3631

373

hatred for another day.'"2 When she read the note, Ellison
became "shocked and frightened and left the room."63Gray followed her, demanding that she talk to him. Ellison left the
building and went home.
The next week, Ellison began a four-week training program in St. Louis. From California, Gray mailed her a threepage, single-spaced, typed letter which she described as much
"weirder'' than the previous note.M In reaction to this letter,
she explained: "I just thought he was crazy. I thought he was
nuts. I didn't know what he would do next. I was frightened."65
Ellison eventually filed a sexual harassment claim in 1987.
After several administrative hearings, a district court granted
the employer's motion for summary judgment on the grounds
that Gray's conduct was neither severe nor pervasive enough to
create a hostile e n ~ i r o n m e n t . ~ ~
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's
decision, holding that a "female plaintiff states a prima facie
case of hostile environment sexual harassment when she alleges conduct which a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment."' The
court then concluded that a reasonable woman in Ellison's
situation would have considered Gray's conduct sufficiently
severe and pervasive to create a hostile en~ironrnent.~~

C. Why the Reasonable Woman Standard
The Ninth Circuit responded to the confusion and judicial
inconsistency in this arena by adopting the reasonable woman
standard. The following analysis demonstrates why the reason-

62.
63.
64.

Id. at 874.
Id.
Id. Parts of the letter read:

"I have enjoyed you so much over these past few months. Watching you.
Experiencing you from 0 so far away."
"I am obligated to you so much that if you want me to leave you alone I
will . . . . If you want me to forget you entirely, I can not [sic] do that."
Id. at 874
65.
Id.
Id.
66.
67.
Id.
Id.
68.

&
at
at
at
at

n.1.
874.
875.
879 (emphasis added).
880.
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able woman standard is a fairer, more logical, more consistent
approach than the reasonable person standard.
1. The EEOCs reasonable person is really a reasonable
woman
The EEOC has clarified the reasonable person standard,
stating that courts " 'should consider the victim's perspective
and not stereotyped notions of acceptable behavior.' "' At no
point do the regulations or Guidelines indicate that the "person" part of the standard requires a strictly gender-neutral perspective. In cases in which the victim is a woman, the "reasonable" perspective should also be that of a woman.
The Guidelines focus more on the concept of objectivity
than on gender neutrality. An objective standard maintains
some semblance of conformity to social norms7' and deters
abuse of the system by either unstable plaintiffs or those seeking an unjust ~indfall.~'
Courts have found that "Title VII
does not serve as a vehicle for vindicating the petty slights
suffered by the hypersensitive."" Consequently, the "reasonableness" or objective part of the standard allows both plaintiffs
and employers to begin on a common ground.
The EEOC instructs courts to consider both the "victim's
perspective" and the "context in which the alleged harassment
took place,"" arguably guiding courts t o use a gender-oriented
perspective. For example, the EEOC "believes that a workplace
in which sexual slurs, displays of 'girlie' pictures, and other
offensive conduct abound can constitute a hostile work environment even if many people deem it to be harmless or insignificant."74In several cases, both women and men have been sub-jetted to such environments. The men, however, considered it
harmless, while the women were offended.75Thus, the EEOC
anticipated that courts would look beyond "male,'' or even gen-

EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 4, 4 405:6690.
69.
See Abrams, supm note 3, at 1210.
70.
One woman stated her opinion that many working women use sexual ploys
71.
to move ahead politically in the workplace. If their designs go awry, they quickly
claim sexual harassment. Interview with former employee (anonymous) of First
Interstate Bank of California, in Provo, Utah (Nov. 20, 1992).
72.
Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
73.
EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 4, 5 405:6690.
Id. (emphasis added).
74.
75.
See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D.
Fla. 1991).
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der-neutral, labels of "harmless or insignificant" and focus instead on how the environment affects the victim. If the victim
is a woman, the court should scrutinize the working environment through her eyes. To maintain the fairness contemplated
by the word "reasonable," that scrutiny should.be tempered by
an objective notion of how other "reasonable" women would
react to the environment.
2. Differing perspec f iues
Women see sexual conduct in the workplace differently
than men, and the Ninth Circuit found this argument to be
~
persuasive in adopting the reasonable woman ~ t a n d a r d . ?The
Ellison court opined that Sterling Gray could have seen his
conduct as that of a modern-day Cyrano de Bergerac, wooing
his lady through desperate, unrequited letters.?? Many "reasonable" men might consider Gray's actions to be merely harmless flirtation and Ellison's resistance to be merely a typical
reaction in the courtship ritual. Ms. Ellison, however, was not
so inclined. To her, Gray's actions were neither harmless nor
trivial; in fact, she testified that the correspondence frightened
her and made her concerned for her safety.?'
Empirical data and scholarly commentary support the conclusion that Ellison's reaction was perfectly rational for a reasonable woman. In fact, even seemingly minor sexual overtures
can generate tremendous fear of greater harm.7g Women's
"physical and social vulnerability to sexual coercion can make
them wary of sexual encounter^."'^ Upon receipt of Gray's
"love notes," Ellison could have easily conjured up images-readily supplied by modern media-of stalkers and imbal-

Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Yates v.
76.
Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 n.2 (6th Cir. 1987) ("We acknowledge that men and
women are vulnerable in different ways and offended by different behavior.");
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990); Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d
611 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Feminist scholars have also argued that women see world experiences differently than men. See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio: Feminist
Methodologies and the Logic of Imagination, 70 TEX.L. REV. 109, 122-24 (1991)
(explaining "different voice feminism"). See generally CAROLGILLIGAN,IN A DIFFERENT VOICE(1990).
77.
924 F.2d a t 880.
78.
Id. at 873-74.
Abrams, supra note 3, at 1205; see also Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880-81.
79.
80.
Abrams, supra note 3, at b W .
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anced sociopaths whose nightmarish pursuits have begun with
a "harmless" letter." Her fears were entirely reasonable from
that perspective.
Most men, on the other hand, may not think that this type
of conduct is offensive at all. In her research of sexual harassment and its effects, Barbara Gutek has concluded that men
are not as sensitized as women to sexual conduct in the
workplace. In one study, she presented males and females with
a series of "positive comments of a sexual nature," such as compliments, social invitations, or expressions of admiration.
Twenty-seven percent of the women respondents saw the comments as offensive, while only eleven percent of the men surveyed felt the comments were ~ffensive.'~When presented
with "negative comments of a sexual nature," such as slang
terms, epithets, vulgarities, and direct sexual propositions or
attacks, a larger percentage from both groups viewed the comments as offensive, but an alarming disparity still existed. Sixty-three percent of the women were offended by the conduct
and comments, while only forty-eight percent of the men were
SO ~ffended.'~
In another study, Gutek found that sixty-seven percent of
the men questioned would actually be flattered by a sexual
. ~ the women, on the
proposition from a female c o - w ~ r k e r Of
other hand, less than seventeen percent would feel flattered by
such an invitation, while almost sixty-three percent would be
in~ulted.'~
The obvious conclusion of Gutek's research is that
women are more likely than men to see sexual conduct as offensive, intimidating, threatening, o r frightening-a phenomenon Gutek terms the "giant gender gap.""
David Terpstra and Douglas Baker concur with Gutek's
studies. They constructed a model that charts sexual harassment as a process, comparing "[blehaviors exhibited by harassers" to the "[b]ehaviors as perceived by harassees."'' The mod-

81.
One well-known example is that of John KincMey Jr.'s infatuation with
actress Jodie Foster. What began with "harmless" love letters resulted in a presidential assassination attempt and Ms. Foster's fear for her life.
See VERONICA
F. NIEVA& BARBARAA. GUTEK, WOMEN AND WORK 63 (1981)
82.
(citing Gutek's 1980 West Coast worker survey).
83.
Id.
See BARBARA
A. GTJTEK, SEXAND THE WORKPLACE96-97(1985).
84.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
87.
Terpstra & Baker, supra note 2, at 179.
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el allowed them to analyze the reactions of the victims and the
long-term psychological effects of harassment? Based on
their own studies, as well as those conducted by Gutek, the
National Merit Systems Protection Board, and others, they
concluded that "women perceive a wider range of socio-sexual
behaviors to be sexual harassment than do men."89 Most participants agreed that behavior such as sexual assault, propositions, physical contact, and offensive remarks directed toward
a n individual constituted haras~rnent.~'However, less than a
consensus existed on whether behaviors such as compliments,
coarse language, jokes, and 'looks'' were haras~ing.~'In answering whether a particular comment or episode of conduct
was harassment, the respondent's gender proved to be the most
influential variable; women were more likely than men to perceive certain conduct as harassing or offensive.g2
These studies demonstrate that women generally have a
heightened awareness and reaction to sexual conduct directed
towards them in the workplace.g3Perhaps a model will clanfy:

Clearly Not
Harassment

Point 1
Reasonable Woman

INCREASING HOSTILITY

Point 2
Reasonable Man

Clearly
Harassment

------ -----------b

This model represents a spectrum of gender-based conduct in
the workplace. On the far left is conduct that theoretically no
one would consider offensive, such as a completely professional
handshake or greeting, void of any overtones. On the far right
is conduct that theoretically everyone should consider offensive
or hostile, such as rape. At Point 1, the conduct begins to offend the reasonable woman. The reasonable male statistically
is not offended until Point 2, somewhere further along the scale

Id.
Id. at 186.
90.
Id. at 188.
91. Id. at 189.
92. Id. at 186.
Perhaps part of the problem is the fact that women tend to see their jobs
93.
as marginalized and precarious to begin with. See MACKINNON,supra note 19, at
15. Thus, any sort of sexual conduct from a man in "power"over her job is threatening and confusing. Id. at 1-7.
88.
89.
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of hostility. Because the reasonable person standard only prohibits conduct that both sexes agree is hostile or offensive, the
conduct falling between Point 1 and Point 2 will go unpunished, forcing reasonable women to endure conduct that offends
them.
3. The judicial reasonable person has really been a reasonable
man

Because men and women see sexual conduct differently, a
gender-neutral standard that allows a trier of fact to see both
sides of the issue at once is impossible to achieve. Applying
Gutek's research, a reasonable woman would likely view Gray's
conduct in Ellison as harassment, while a "reasonable man"
probably would noteg4When courts use the reasonable person
standard, they attempt to "step into the shoes" of a completely
objective, gender-neutral person, without giving weight to the
biases of either sex. Although this approach may arguably be
possible in theory, it is not possible in practice; if no genderneutral person exists, its viewpoint cannot exist either. Each
trier of fact is inevitably forced to decide if the reasonable
person's perspective is that of a reasonable man or a reasonable woman. It is disingenuous to assume the trier of fact can
somehow find the "middle of the road."
Some commentators argue that triers of fact, when applying the reasonable person standard, will choose the male perspective by default. For example, Kathryn Abrams asserts that
because our society is based on a gender hierarchy, male views
~
Nancy
dominate the reasonable person ~ t a n d a r d . 9Similarly,
Ehrenreich argues that the reasonable person standard neutralizes the search for diversity and pluralism and makes all
experience conform to the dominant male e~perience.'~Catharine MacKinnon also posits that the "core of the legal prohibition" of sexual harassment is based on a "male vision" of
women's experience^.^?
The Ninth Circuit asserts in Ellison that the reasonable
94.
See GUTEK, supra note 84, at 95-105.
95.
Abrams, supra note 3, at 1206 n.103.
Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The
96.
Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALEL.J. 1177, 1218
also Peter Linzer & Patricia A. Tidwell, Letter to David Dow-Friendly
L. REV.861, 862 (1991) ("[Tlhe concept of
Critical Friend, 28 HOUSTON
ness rarely includes points of view outside the main stream.?.
supra note 19, at 26.
97.
MACKINNON,

Ideology of
(1990); see
Critic and
reasonable-
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"person" standard has ignored the experiences and perceptions
of women and instead has ratified "male-biased" stereotypes?'
In his dissent in Rabidue, Judge Keith argues that the reasonable person standard fails to account for differences between
the views of most women and men regarding appropriate sexual conduct.99 In Harris v. International Paper Co.,lO' the
court asserts that the reasonable person standard is contrary to
the directives of the EEOC Guidelines because it supports
traditional notions of reasonable behavior established by the offenders.''' The inevitable conclusion is that a purely genderneutral perspective is a dangerous and unfair legal fiction.
Such a standard, unfortunately, has only been a proxy for the
male point of view.lo2

D. The Arguments Against the Reasonable Woman Standard
In his dissent in Ellison v. Brady,lo3 Judge Stephens

Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); see, e.g., Hall v. Gus
98.
Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988) (suggesting that sexual innuendo, vulgar
language, and pornography are simply stronger forms of "rough manners"); Rabidue
v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 621 (6th Cir. 1986) (explaining that Title VII is
not a "cure-all" designed to eliminate all problems in the workplace or to work
some "magical transformation" of the working environment); cf: Abrams, supra note
3, at 1201 (arguing that this type of reasoning reflects an "almost amused tolerance that reflects no awareness of how female plaintiffs might perceive these affronts"); Pollack, supra note 39, at 67 (noting that much of the harassing behavior
occurring in the workplace is tolerated by courts as a male prerogative).
Rabcdue, 805 F.2d a t 626 (Keith, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
99.
(citing Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title
VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (1984)).
765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me. 1991).
100.
101. Id. at 1513 (citing Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir.
1988)); cf. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 4, $ 405:6690 ("The reasonable person standard should consider the victim's perspective and not stereotyped notions
of acceptable behavior.").
102. Another possible argument against the reasonable person standard is that it
frustrates the underlying theory and purpose of Title VII. The statute was originally invoked in hostile environment cases because sexual harassment was seen as
discriminatory-a woman was treated differently because of her sex. See Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982); Rabidue, 805 F.2d a t 620.
Arguably, the reasonable person standard requires the trier of f a d to attempt to
view the offending conduct from the perspective of both sexes. Thus, any conduct
which is deemed offensive under this analysis would not technically be discriminatory, and Title VII would not apply. The reasonable woman or victim standard, on
the other hand, allows the court to better understand how the offending conduct
was perceived by the victim. The court can then punish conduct, not simply because it treats one gender differently than another, but because it treats one individual differently because of gender.
103. 924 F.2d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 1991) (Stephens, J., dissenting).
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summarizes several arguments against the new standard. He
states that the reasonable woman standard is "ambiguous and
therefore inadequate."lo4 Consequently, he argues, the "gender neutral standard would greatly contribute to the clarity of
this and future cases in the same area."lo5
Judge Stephens also argues that "[a] man's response to
circumstances faced by women and their effect upon women
can be and in given circumstances may be expected to be understood by men."lo6He criticizes the majority's "assumption"
that "men's eyes do not see what a woman sees through her
eyes."lo7 However, Judge Stephens's "ass~mption'~
that men
and women see sexual conduct in the workplace in the same
light is directly contradicted by empirical data. The Gutek and
TerpstraBaker studies show that men and women do not see
sexual conduct in the workplace in the same way. What may be
highly offensive to a woman might be considered harmless by a
male co-worker.lo8
The studies indicate that more of a consensus exists on the
major offenses; men and women are more likely to agree that
certain egregious types of sexual conduct, such as assault, rape,
and violence, constitute harassment.lo9However, Title VII jurisprudence is not merely concerned with the most egregious
offenses; it is equally concerned with eliminating all traces of
di~crimination.~'~
If sexually oriented jokes, comments, gestures, and "sienerf are offensive to the average female worker,
a hostile environment exists. Even if men would generally
consider the conduct harmless, the court should defer to the
reasonable woman's view.

E. Alternatives to the Reasonable Woman Standard

1. The gender-neutral approach
Judge Stephens argues that the reasonable person standard affords better protection to everyone because of its gender
neutrality. The judge is concerned that if a male were to bring
a hostile environment claim, the reasonable woman standard

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 76-93 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 90.
Cf. supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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may not "meet [his] needs.""' However, the Ellison majority
addressed that issue: "Of course, where male employees allege
that co-workers engage in conduct which creates a hostile environment, the appropriate victim's perspective would be that of
a reasonable man."'" Thus, the perspective is really that of a
reasonable person of the victim's gender.ll3 Because Ellison
and the vast majority of cases involve women, the court chose
simply to emphasize a woman's perspective.

2. The subjective "prima facie" approach
Some commentators argue that although the reasonable
woman standard is a good step, the ideal approach is a completely subjective standard.'14 Under such a rubric, each
claim of harassment would create a rebuttable presumption of
a Title VII violation. First, the claimant states a prima facie
hostile environment case simply by pleading that the conduct
was unwelcome and offended her. To rebut the presumption of
a Title VII violation, the defendant then has the burden to
prove that the plaintiff was idiosyncratic. The plaintiff can then
counter by proving either that she is not idiosyncratic or that
the defendant "exploited" her idiosyncracy.
Although this subjective standard focuses on the victim's
perspective and would provide an initial advantage to claimants, such an approach arguably places a n onerous economic
burden on employers. To demonstrate, a woman employee
could allege she was offended by a male co-worker's smile, and
that allegation alone would establish a prima facie case. The
employer would then have the difficult task of proving that the
claimant's idiosyncracy revolves, around her paranoid belief
that each smile is actually a perverse and lecherous sneer, that
each look is one of lust. If the defendant were unsuccessful, or
if the claimant could prove that the defendant knew of her
uniqueness and "exploited" it by smiling a t her, then she would
win. Under such an approach, the litigation costs of Title VII
would become too extreme. The inevitable economic consequences would be lost profits and fewer employees. Balance,

111. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 1991) (Stephens, J., dissenting).
924 F.2d at 879 all.
112.
113. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 627 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
114. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 3, at 1209 & n.110.
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therefore, is crucial: though the aim of Title VII is to protect
victimized employees, it is also important to protect employers
from potentially meritless litigation.
Analytically, the subjective standard does not provide women with any greater consideration or protection than does the
reasonable woman standard. In fact, the reasonable woman
standard will arguably produce the same positive results for
reasonable claimants without placing an undue burden on employers to defend frivolous litigation. Under the subjective approach, a court would engage in a comparison very similar to
the objective standard; in order to evaluate the claimant's "idiosyncracy," the court would have to judge her against a n objective, reasonable woman standard. Why not begin the analysis
at that point? Proving the claimant is "reasonable" is no different than proving she is "not idiosyncratic." In fact, proving a
positive may be even less burdensome on the claimant. As the
Ellison court points out, the reasonable woman standard is designed to safeguard against the "idiosyncratic concerns of the
~
still providing
rare hyper-sensitive e m p l ~ y e e , " ' ~while
heightened sensitivity to women's concerns. Thus, an objective
standard satisfies the concerns expressed by the commentators,
while providing a n economic balance for all parties.

IV. CONCLUSION
Analyzing hostile environment claims through the eyes of a
reasonable woman accurately reflects and fulfills the
antidiscrimination designs of Title VII. That standard, as opposed to a gender-neutral reasonable person standard or a n
individualized subjective standard, will arguably provide better
judicial protection for those who have suffered the humiliation
of sexual harassment in the workplace.
Adoption of the reasonable woman standard is the most
effective way for courts to gain a clearer understanding of what
conduct offends the victims of sexual harassment, and it will
significantly enhance courts' ability to eradicate sexually harassing conduct.'" Courts have already begun to follow
Ellison.117 In Harris v. International Paper Co., for example,
115. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
116.
Employers have a vested interest in eliminating sexual harassment from
their work environments. In addition to saving the costs of defending lawsuits,
studies have demonstrated that reduction of sexual harassment increases morale,
productivity, and profits. See Mathews, supra note 7, at 308.
117. See, e.g., Stingley v. Arizona, 796 F. Supp. 424 (D. Ariz. 1992); Harris v.
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the theoretical underpinnings of the standard were aptly summarized: "Since the concern of Title VII is to redress effects on
victims, the fact-finder must 'walk a mile in the victim's shoes'
to understand those effects . . . ."118

David L.Pinkston

International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me. 1991).
118. Harris, 765 F. Supp. a t 1516.

